Let us now direct our attention to Aristotle’s apparent opposition to Plato in his treatise On the Soul. The design of Aristotle then in this treatise is to examine the opinions of the philosophers prior to, or contemporary with him respecting the soul, to approve of whatever may be truly asserted, and to detect whatever may not be delivered according to the accustomed use of names, lest receiving the opinions of the ancients conformably to these, we should be deceived. Plato, therefore, gave the name of motion to the life of the soul, in consequence of its being evolved, and being neither in every respect # partible, nor remaining purely impartible, denominating also such a life motion, from its declination from an # impartible nature, and asserting that the essence of the soul is self-movable, as being essentialized according to such a life. Hence, through the word movable he indicates the # subordination of this life to an impartible nature; but by the word self, its permanency in the impartible, and a life at the same time abiding in and proceeding from itself. But Aristotle being accustomed to give the name of motion to that nature alone which is partible, and is numbered according to continuity, conformably to the common use of the word, not only denies motion of the psychical essence, but does not appear to admit that the soul is in any way moved by itself. Thus too, Plato calls the transition which is produced through the energy of the # soul motion, such as is to consider and consult; and, indeed, he denominates the regression of the soul from an intelligible and impartible essence, motion. But Aristotle alone calls that transition motion which is successive and continued. It is evident, therefore, that here also the difference between the two philosophers is in names only, and not in things.
Again, it was usual with the Pythagoreans to philosophize symbolically through the mathematics, about things # supernatural, those pertaining to # the soul, and such as are physical. Plato also assuming the person of the Pythagorean Timaeus, as he exhibits him ascribing the five right-lined solid figures to simple bodies, so likewise, he represents him unfolding the essence of the soul of the universe, through right and circular lines; in order that he may, at the same time, indicate its middle nature, between an essence indivisible, and that which is divisible, about # bodies; just as a line, also, is the middle of a point, and of # solids; and its proximate subordination to intellect. And farther still, that he might indicate by this its undeviating progression, proceeding from itself, which a right line signifies, and through a circular inflexion, the conversion to itself; just as through the habitude of one right line to two, and again, of a more inward habitude to seven, he indicates the causal comprehension of the celestial spheres, according to an appropriate middle. For this comprehension does not subsist like intellect, impartibly, but after the manner of soul with evolution, of which circular lines are a symbol, just as the motion of these lines is a symbol of psychical life; for, though intellect moves the heavens, yet it is in conjunction with soul, which, through its peculiar evolved life, as a middle, produces the impartible, motive, energy of intellect, into the continued and partible energy of the heavens; which energy alone Aristotle denominates motion, and opposes Timaeus, as attributing to the soul an energy divisible, and attended with interval, lest we, following the accustomed use of names, and, conformably to this, receiving what is asserted by Plato, should form an opinion, that the soul is either a certain magnitude, or is corporeally moved. It is evident, also, that the connexion of the soul with the body must not be considered locally, but according to the proximate and essential presence of it through the whole of the body. But the composition of it from the elements, manifests its completion from essence, sameness, and difference, and, in short, its possession in common of the constitutive peculiarities of beings, so far as beings; this, likewise, being appropriately assumed in the soul; for all beings consist from all such things as are common, but each appropriately according to the order which it is allotted. Again the division, according to harmonic numbers, indicates the hypostasis, or subsistence of all reasons in the soul, and the mode of the subsistence, viz. declining to separation, and being collected into the impartible, and, on this account, divided according to the harmony of numbers; for harmony, through the collection of symphony, is indicative of reasons established according to different peculiarities; for numbers are significant of peculiarities. The # soul of the world, however, by her inherent reasons, moves the heavens with an harmonious relation, and knows the harmony which subsists in natures superior to, and subordinate to herself; because these reasons are conjoined to superior natures, according to continuity, and are the causes of subordinate natures, so that the celestial circulations are produced through # the evolved life of soul. Aristotle, therefore, demonstrating that the soul is incorporeal, and that she has an energy not divided according to continuity, confutes the assertion, that she is moved circularly after the manner of corporeal magnitudes; for such a motion is adapted to bodies, as being essentialized according to interval, but, by no means, to soul, and especially to the soul of the universe.
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# impartible nature: directionality within design, as attributable to manner or inclination, also in celestial bodies to include Earth cf. ■→Perseus, natu. Belief in the soul parting from the body and “going somewhere”, be it hell, heaven, or afterlife, remains popular today as well.
Notes for Emily Dickinson’s poetry
Fascicles and print, the poetic correlative with Webster 1828, Latin and Greek inspiration, an Aristotelian motif, Things perpetual — these are not in time, but in eternity. More→
Life | Love | Nature | Time and Eternity
# solid: firm, or of unvaried manifestation in form; might be waveform, or as drops of water, or crystals; cf. colloquial today, “solid shine”; the opposite to be # body, corpuscular, where pieces of rock might be of unpredictable shapes.
Project Lexica works human vocabulary and ■→notionality, not assessment on knowledge and civilization. Paradigmatic thinking, as of the ancients, might work like gramatical prediction, that is, in context new and unfamiliar to the thinker; it is not the same as classic rules of grammar; cf. # the impartible, that some might compare to black holes as relatively only recently discovered. Lexica is not to take theories on influence by more advanced civilizations either; only words, their context and paradigms, as perceptible in works.
# soul: for celestial bodies, design as originated by the cause or first principle, “the soul of the universe” or “the soul of the world”; for people, the possibly immortal and own mind, intellect; cf. ■→Wiktionary, sense 9. Plato’s theory would tell human souls are in close proximity to the cause or first principle; Aristotle says human souls would have to be perpetual then, on grounds of theories for motion; he does not deny human souls may be intellectual and immortal.
# the evolved life of soul: in the context, the celestial design as capable of change.
# subordination: inequality in scope or extent; cf. Perseus broad search, ■→sub, senses as “somewhat, a little, kind of”, subadmovere; “ratio”, subdimidius (superdimidius).
Cf. Wiktionary, sub■→ordine, of ordo, as also for a kind (noun), or a factor in common: belief in soul immortality also remains popular today, cf. # impartible nature.
# supernatural: of scope wider than Earth.
The world may never have seen her original handwriting, if her skill was taken for supernatural. Feel welcome to Poems by Emily Dickinson prepared for print by Teresa Pelka: thematic stanzas, notes on the Greek and Latin inspiration, the correlative with Webster 1828, and the Aristotelian motif, Things perpetual — these are not in time, but in eternity.
Świat może i nigdy nie widział jej oryginalnego pisma, jeśli jej umiejętność została wzięta za nadnaturalną. Zapraszam do Wierszy Emilii Dickinson w przekładzie Teresy Pelka: zwrotka tematyczna, notki o inspiracji greką i łaciną, korelacie z Websterem 1828 oraz wątku arystotelesowskim, Rzecz perpetualna — ta nie zasadza się na czasie, ale na wieczności.
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